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International Debt and the Act of State Doctrine:
Judicial Abstention Reconsidered
W.H. Knight, Jr. *
Professor Knight examines the act of the state doctrine as it affects repudia-
tion of loans made to foreign governments. Professor Knight concludes that
judicial abstention based on the act of state doctrine is itself a statement of
foreign policy, despite the judiciary's repeated assertion that the purpose of the
doctrine is to remove the judiciary from international politics. Professor Knight
argues that U.S. courts should abstain from rendering judgment in cases in-
volving dept repudiation by foreign governments only if the executive branch is
currently involved in settling the disputes arising from the repudiation. Profes-
sor Knight further argues that the executive branch has an affirmative duty,
under federal banking law, to intervene in such dept disputes, and that the
judiciary should recognize a power to require the executive branch to act.
Loan default is every banker's nightmare; debt repudiation is
simply unthinkable. Yet, for most U.S. bankers who deal in multina-
tional lending, the unthinkable is perilously close to becoming a real-
ity. Recent additions by banks to their loan loss reserves represent
admissions that they do not reasonably expect to recover money
loaned to foreign governments, particularly those in Central and
South America.' Bank acknowledgment that portions of sovereign
debt are expected to be lost may set the stage for a real and immedi-
ate crisis.
To date, sovereign risk lending has been considered a purely
private enterprise that required individual banks to bear the conse-
quences of international loans which turned sour. There is sub-
stance, however, to bank pleas for federal assistance in managing
sovereign loans. The failure of one or two multinational banking in-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa. B.A., University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill; J.D., Columbia University. Patrick Bauaer, Tracey Burton, William Buss,
Jonathan Carlson. Malvina Halberstam, Frederick Hart, Susan Mask, Richard Matasar,
Barry Matsumoto, Kim Sorrells, David Vernon, Burns Weston, Gregory Williams and Pe-
ter Winship all made incisive, detailed, and appreciated criticisms, some of which I un-
wisely ignored.
I See, e.g.. Chase Joins Banks Taking Loan Loss-Like Citicoip, It .Icknowledges Third World
Debt Problem, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1987, at 1, col. 3. BankAnierica Raisintg Rese ve SI. I Billion:
.llannfactirers Hanover .Muills Similar Step, Wall St. J., June 9, 1987, at 3, col. 1. More Big
Banks Boost Reserves on Loan l'oes, Wall St.J.,June 12, 1987, at 2. col. 2. It should be noted
that money-center banks were not the only institutions to have encountered problems with
sovereign loans. Major regional banks also announced increases to loan-loss reserves. See
also .Vorest 7'a Raise Loan-Loss Reserve By S200 .1illion, Wall St.J., May 27, 1987. at 2. col. 3.
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stitutions could jeopardize the entire U.S. banking system and thus
threaten the nation's economic stability. Protecting institutional
lenders from sovereign default is therefore in the nation's best inter-
est. This important national interest can be secured only through
the combined efforts of the judicial and executive branches of gov-
ernment. Achieving the necessary protection will require a reinter-
pretation of the act of state doctrine (act of state or doctrine). 2
Act of state prohibits U.S. courts from inquiring into the validity
of public acts by a recognized foreign sovereign when the acts in
question occur within that country's own territory. 3 Much has been
written about act of state in the context of its effect on thejudiciary's
ability to provide redress to parties claiming injury by expropria-
tion.4 While less has been written about the doctrine's application in
cases of foreign sovereign debt, there is a developing body of com-
ment.5 Recent commentary addresses the issue of what options U.S.
lending institutions face in the event a debtor nation defaults 6 on or
actually repudiates 7 its loan obligations.
Under conventional interpretations of act of state, the doctrine
would require courts to apply a foreign state's law without consider-
ing whether that law violates either U.S. or international law. A
2 Debt restructuring remains a primary concern of contract law which cannot be reg-
ulated effectively. Consequently, this paper takes the position that congressional partici-
pation in sovereign debt negotiations would not be helpful.
3 Banco.Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). See generallv RE-
STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED) § 469 comments a-c,
reporter's note I (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986). However, the sovereign is obligated to pay
just compensation for its takings under principles of international law. Id. § 712.
4 See, e.g., Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325 (1986);
Chow, Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 62
WASH. L. REV. 397 (1987); Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected: The Act of State Doctrine in the
Revised Restatement of U. S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 68 (1985); Comment, The
Act of State Doctrine: A Histor
, 
of Judicial Limitations and Exceptions, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 677
(1977); Note, Limiting the Act of State Doctrine: A Legislative Initiative, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 103
(1982).
5 But see Ebenroth & Teitz, I Vinning (or Losing) by Default: Tile Act of State Doctrine, Sover-
eign Imninit, and Comity in International Business Transactions, 19 INT'L LAW. 225 (1985);
Reisner, Default & Foreign Sovereign Debtors: An introductory Perspective, 1982 ILL. L. REV. 1;
Note, The Act of State Doctrine: Resolving Debt Situs Confusion, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 594 (1986);
Note, Allreds Flawed Application of the .ct of State Doctrine: Impropriety of the Doctrine in Interiia-
tional Finance, 20 CORNELL INT. L.J. 253 (1987); Note, Default on Foreign Sovereign Debt: .A
Question for the Courts?, 18 IND. L. REV. 959 (1985); Comment, Debt Situs and the Act of State
Doctrine: A Proposal for a MVore Flexible Standard, 49 ALB. L. REV. 647 (1985).
Ii The term default may be somewhat misleading. Technically, default occurs when-
ever there is a failure to perform a legal duty. In the case of lending, default could be
found to have occurred through the failure to pay principal or interest on a debt. Under
that definition, many debtor nations arguably have already defaulted by failing to make any
principal payments for extended periods of time. Many countries have incurred additional
debt to enable them to pay the interest on previously established obligations. Such a prac-
tice is unsotnd policy for both creditor and debtor.
7 Repudiation would involve a nation's public authorities refusing to acknowledge or
pay a debt. It is nol a new development in international lending. See, e.g., Miller v. Na-
tional City Bank, 166 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1948) (Russian repudiation of foreign debt in-
curred by Czar).
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debtor nation's nonpayment of its loan obligations would be consid-
ered a sovereign act not subject to judicial questioning based on U.S.
contract and debtor-creditor law. By the very act of nonpayment, a
debtor nation already would have indicated what it believed to be the
legally appropriate measure. The consequences of nonpayment thus
would have to be resolved without the benefit of the very law that the
parties agreed should govern. 8 Additionally, there are no apparent
directives that compel intervention by either Congress or the Execu-
tive. Furthermore, suit in the International Court of Justice would
be unlikely because all parties must consent to the Court's jurisdic-
tion. It is quite improbable that a debtor nation would agree to have
any outside court evaluate its decisions involving sovereign debt. In
effect, act of state deprives an aggrieved lender of both the agreed-
upon governing forum and any real likelihood of success in recover-
ing a judgment against a nonpaying sovereign debtor.
Act of state is not a political question problem because its appli-
cation does not result in case dismissal. The effect of applying foreign
law to a sovereign expropriation, however, yields a result that is
quite similar to judicial abstention in political question cases. Be-
cause any expropriation is a delicate political issue, courts have used
the doctrine as a means of abstaining. 9 The doctrine presupposes
the existence of certain conditions before a court can refuse review.
Unfortunately, those conditions have not been clearly established.
The underlying bases for the principle, coupled with the mechanical
rules used to apply or except the doctrine, have led to particular con-
fusion in cases involving intangible property like sovereign debt.
This article suggests that the conventional judicial approach to
foreign expropriation be reconsidered in cases involving sovereign
risk loans. The U.S. courts provide the only forum for effective re-
dress of international debt problems and should remain open to the
claims of U.S. lender banks. Some courts have construed act of state
to create an absolute bar to review while other courts have devel-
oped exceptions to the doctrine which permit sovereign debt repay-.
ment disputes to be adjudicated under U.S. law. By examining the
philosophical underpinnings of act of state cases, it will be argued
that in cases involving sovereign debt, current analytical approaches
to the doctrine focus on the wrong sovereign. Judicial review should
be directed toward examining the actions of the U.S. executive
branch rather than those of the foreign debtor nation. Contrary to
8 It is customary in contract drafting and loan documentation that the choice of law
will be a jurisdiction known and likely favorable to the lender. See generally Peterson, Con-
flirt Avoidance Through Choice of LaW and Forum, in DRAFTING CONTRACTS AND COMMERCIAL
INSTRUMENTS 158, 163-65 (Research and Documentation Corp. 1971) (discussing and pro-
viding examples of choice-of-law clauses in international agreements).
) For lack of a better term, this paper uses the word "abstention" to refer to court
decisions to refuse review under principles of U.S. law.
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its stated goal, judicial abstention does not shelter courts from help-
ing to create foreign policy in a haphazard manner.
A reformulated act of state theory would continue to presume
that the executive branch is, constitutionally, the appropriate branch
to develop and carry out U.S. foreign policy. The doctrine reconsid-
ered, for the first time, would recognize that implicit in the prohibi-
tion is an expectation that the executive branch is acting to resolve
debt disputes which affect foreign affairs. Thus, the essence of act of
state should be that courts should refrain from acting only when the
executive is already involved in debt disputes.
In cases of foreign sovereign debt, the executive's involvement
has been less than stalwart. Pragmatically, loan default or debt repu-
diation by a sovereign is of such national importance that the execu-
tive should act. In many instances, however, the administration has
shunned participation in these so-called "private" commercial af-
fairs. This article argues that executive intervention in the sovereign
debt crisis is a duty expressly required under federal banking law.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was created under
the Banking Act of 1933 to protect bank depositors, to maintain pub-
lic confidence in the banking system, and to promote safe and sound
banking practices.' 0 By linking executive action to federal legisla-
tion, the primary obstacle confronting judicial review-executive dis-
cretion-is overcome. Because Congress has directed the executive
to maintain public confidence in banks by promoting safe and sound
operations, the executive's inaction in foreign sovereign debt
problems arguably violates a legislatively-prescribed duty. Where
the executive fails to meet its duties, courts have the power to order
mediation on behalf of private commercial banks, despite act of
state's apparent prohibition.
This article is divided into three parts. Part one describes the
historical development of the act of state doctrine and demonstrates
that the judiciary has misconceived the doctrine by interpreting it to
preclude any judicial action when a foreign sovereign commits an act
of expropriation. This part will explore the tension between absten-
tion and the court's role as arbiter. Part two examines the interna-
tional debt problem" and suggests why act of state's mechanical
10 PUB. L. No. 66, 48 Stat. 162, 168 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1811
(1982)). The primary language of the act centers around the FDIC's duty to act to main-
tain the safety and soundness of the banking system. For general discussion of the con-
cept, see Edwards & Scott, Regulating the Solvency of Depository Institutions, in ISSUES IN
FINANCIAL REGULATION 65 (F.R. Edwards ed. 1979) and Walles, The Banking Act of 1933 in
Operation, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 697 (1935).
11 See generally Goldstein, The Continuing World Debt COisis, 3 INT'L TAX & Btus. I.AW. 119
(1983) (discussing the causes and the magnitude of the world debt). The total debt of the
less developed countries (LDCs) was around $700 billion in 1983. Johnson, International
Ban/k Lending After the Slowdown, THE BANKER 26 (Jan. 1984), reprinted in id. at 131; see also
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEBT TABLES (1987).
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principles of territoriality'do not address the issues created by sover-
eign lending. This section argues that loan repayment difficulties are
matters of national concern and that the executive branch is a neces-
sary party 12 in any dispute between a U.S. lender and a sovereign
debtor. It also explores the constitutional underpinnings of the doc-
trine as it relates to sovereign debt. Finally, part three argues for
judicial activism by reviewing the banking concept of safety and
soundness and contending that in cases of sovereign debt, federal
banking law requires executive intervention.
I. Development of the Act of State Doctrine
The doctrine was first articulated by a British court in Blad v.
Bamfield,' 3 in which the defendant, acting under the authority of the
King of Denmark, appropriated property of British citizens living in
Iceland. The court refused to rule on the validity of the foreign con-
fiscatory acts, thus precluding suit by the defendant in England. 14
The U.S. Supreme Court first articulated a policy of judicial
noninvolvement in 1808 in the case of Hudson v. Guestier,15 which in-
volved the seizure by the French of a U.S.-owned vessel. The ship
was taken to a Cuban port and condemned by a French court sitting
in Guadeloupe. ChiefJustice Marshall found French jurisdiction was
proper, and concluded that since the vessel was in the lawful posses-
sion of a foreign sovereign, "no foreign court is at liberty to question
the correctness of what is done." 16
Almost ninety years after Hudson, the philosophical basis for the
act of state doctrine was stated in Underhill v. Hernandez :17 interna-
tional comity required judicial restraint. Comity is 'a principle of
courtesy, not of law, by which one nation recognizes the governmen-
tal acts of another nation and defers to that country's jurisdiction.1 8
12 Rule 19(a) of the federal rules of civil procedure provides in part:
A person . . . shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that
the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter im-
pair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the per-
sons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations .. . If he has not been so
joined, the court shall order that he be made a party.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
13 36 Eng. Rep. 992, 993 (Ch. 1674).
14 Id.
15 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293 (1808).
I ( Id. at 294. It is uncertain whether the court's holding was based upon principles of
personal jurisdiction, rules of admiralty, or substantive law. Hudson has been viewed sub-
sequently as a principle of substantive law.
17 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
18 In Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895), the Supreme Court stated that
comity required a balancing of international duty and convenience with rights and inter-
ests of American citizens.
Comity also lay at the foundation of U.S. domestic law of personal jurisdiction during
1988]
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In Underhill, a U.S. citizen operated a waterworks and machinery re-
pair business in Venezuela. After the 1892 revolution, Underhill was
refused a passport by General Hernandez, the new civil and military
chief of the area. Underhill alleged that he was under house arrest
and that he had been assaulted by Hernandez's soldiers. When fi-
nally permitted to leave the country, Underhill brought suit in the
United States against Hernandez for damages sustained during his
detention. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision
denying Underhill recovery. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Fuller noted that:
[e]very sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit
in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within
its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must
be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves.
19
Hernandez's acts were equated with those of the Venezuelan govern-
ment, and as such were not justiciable in a U.S. court.20
During the first half of the twentieth century, there were a
number of courts which accepted Underhill's sovereignty rationale as
a basis for act of state. Some courts invoked the doctrine despite
judicial questions concerning the validity of foreign government con-
fiscatory decrees. 21 Other courts, uncomfortable with the doctrine,
sought ways to avoid the prohibition. By precluding judicial review,
the doctrine failed to recognize the possibility of concurrent claims
the period. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), the Supreme Court noted, as an
elementary principle of law, that each sovereign had exclusive power over those within its
borders and no power over those outside.
19 168 U.S. at 252.
20 The Supreme Court again enunciated this theme in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297 (1918). In that case, the plaintiff-assignee of a Mexican hide merchant
sought to recover hides that had been confiscated by a general in the Mexican army and
sold to the defendant. Plaintiff claimed that confiscation violated international law prohib-
iting the taking of private property under article 46 of the 1907 Hague Convention. 36
Stat. 2277, 2306-07 T.S. No. 539 (1907). In denying recovery, the Court held:
The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be
successfully questioned in the courts of another ... rests upon the highest
considerations of international comity and expediency. To permit the valid-
ity of the acts of one sovereign state to be re-examined and perhaps con-
demned by the courts of another would very certainly "imperil the amicable
relations between governments and vex the peace of nations." . . . The rem-
edy of the former owner, or of the purchaser from him, of the property in
controversy, if either has any remedy, must be found in the courts of Mexico
or through the diplomatic agencies of the political department of our
government.
246 U.S. at 303-04.
21 See, e.g., Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937) (Mexican expropriation of real
property); U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (Rus-
sian nationalization decrees); U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945); The Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953); National
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Republic of China, 254 F.2d 177 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 358 U.S. 823
(1958); cf. Miller v. National City Bank, 166 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1948) (act of state not in-
voked in suit by class of loan participants involving Russian repudiation of foreign debt).
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to jurisdiction. Why should a U.S. court, which had a legitimate in-
terest in hearing a case, defer to a foreign state's acts of expropria-
tion? The result was to give greater effect to foreign rather than
domestic law in act of state controversies.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit established the first
exception to the doctrine's abstention principle in Bernstein v. Neder-
landsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvart Maatschappi 22 which came to be
called the "Bernstein Letter Exception." The plaintiff sought to re-
cover two ships expropriated by the German Government during
World War II. At the time of the suit, the ships were under the con-
trol of Nederlandsche, a Dutch corporation. The Second Circuit af-
firmed the part of the district court's holding that the act of state
doctrine precluded judicial inquiry into the validity of the German
Government's actions. 23
Two months after the court of appeals decision, the U.S. State
Department issued a "general interest" press release which stated
that the executive branch did not object to the exercise of jurisdic-
tion by U.S. courts in suits involving property expropriated by the
German Government.24 On rehearing, the court cited the press re-
lease and allowed the district court to consider this claim.2 5 The
Bernstein court's turnaround complicated the act of state concept by
giving the judiciary an alternative to abstention. Still, the court of
appeals' treatment of the State Department letter raised questions
concerning the separation of powers principle and the court's inde-
pendence to decide whether to hear a case. Specifically, would judi-
cial review be linked to approval from another branch of
government?
The Bernstein decision raised questions about the very basis of
the act of state doctrine. Assuming it were proper to hear an expro-
priation case when the executive branch stated that foreign policy
would not be affected by a hearing, the reviewing court need not
presume that executive silence means a court should refrain from
hearing a case. Despite a court's ability to request executive brief-
ings on foreign policy, or to consider pertinent treaties and legisla-
tive history, the question of justiciability is and should be a decision
for the court alone. 26
The Supreme Court has refused to address the continuing valid-
22 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949).
2 Id. at 78.
"24 See Jurisdiction of the United States Courts for Identifiable Property Involved in Nazi Forced
Transfers, 20 DEP'T ST. BULL. 592, 593 (1949).
25 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
26 See Folsom, The Sabbatino Case: Rule of Law or Rule of "No Law"?, 51 A.B.A.J. 725
(1965).
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ity of the Bernstein exception 27 and, not surprisingly, "Bernstein Let-
ters" have influenced the result in several subsequent cases.28
A. Act of State Reconsidered. Sabbatino
During its 1964 term, the Supreme Court reviewed the act of
state concept. This time, however, the Court articulated a different
rationale for the doctrine than that found in Underhill; namely, that
the judiciary's limited competence in this area found its basis in the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. 29
In Sabbatino,30 the Cuban Government expropriated property of
the Compania Azucarera Veritenties-Camaguey de Cuba (CAV).
CAV agreed to sell sugar to a U.S. commodity broker, Farr Whitlock
& Co. (Farr). Under the sales agreement, Farr was to pay for the
sugar upon presentation of a sight draft and a bill of lading in New
York. On the day that CAV's sugar was being loaded in Havana, the
Cuban government, which had nationalized all property in which
U.S. nationals held an interest, expropriated all of CAV's property.
The expropriation decree declared that no boats could leave the har-
bor without permission from the new government. The decree
amounted to government blackmail; in order to obtain permission to
leave Cuban waters, Farr was required to enter new contracts with a
quasi-governmental agency which were identical to those already ex-
ecuted between Farr and CAV. The Cuban agency then assigned the
bills of lading to Banco Nacional which tendered the documents to
Farr's New York bank. Farr refused to pay Banco Nacional, claiming
that it had previously paid CAV. Banco Nacional brought suit to re-
cover the money allegedly due under the bill of lading.
The Court was faced with the issue of whether the act of state
27 But see First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972),
and discussion infra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir.
1971); Wyman v. U.S., 143 Ct. Cl. 846, 166 F. Supp. 766 (1958); Zwack v. Kraus Bros. &
Co., 237 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1956).
29
We do not believe that this doctrine is compelled either by the inherent na-
ture of sovereign authority .... or by some principle of international law ....
Despite the broad statement in Oetjen that "The conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the Execu-
tive and Legislative ... Departments," .... it cannot of course be thought that
"every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judi-
cial cognizance."... The text of the Constitution does not require the act of
state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity
to review the validity of foreign acts of state.
The act of state doctrine does, however, have "constitutional" underpin-
nings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of govern-
ment in a system of separation of powers. It concern.s the competency of
dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of decisions in
the area of international relations.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421, 423 (1964) (citation omitted).
30 Id.
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doctrine applied to sovereign acts considered by the United States to
be in violation of international law. 3 ' Citing Bernstein, Farr argued
that the doctrine applied only at the executive branch's specific sug-
gestion and was not available in instances where a foreign govern-
ment was plaintiff in a U.S. court.32 The Supreme Court rejected the
argument and held that the act of state doctrine barred U.S. courts
from examining the claim. Judicial review would require a decision
on the validity of Cuba's expropriation decree. The executive, as op-
posed to the judiciary, was better equipped to address the ramifica-
tions of a sovereign taking. Justice Harlan's opinion noted several
factors that would enable the executive to act more effectively: the
administration's ability to award discretionary foreign aid, the en-
couragement of private American investment, the possibility of eco-
nomic sanctions, and the freezing of foreign assets in the United
States.3 3 Justice Harlan also noted, "If the political branches are un-
willing to exercise their ample powers to effect compensation, this
reflects ajudgment of the national interest which the judiciary would
be ill-advised to undermine indirectly." 34
The Sabbatino decision now required courts to consider the ex-
tent to which a foreign sovereign could be offended by judicial inter-
vention. International comity as well as the constitutional principle
of separation of powers had to be factored into the decision to grant
review. If an expropriation had consequences which extended be-
yond the sovereign's relationships in the United States, act of state
compelled restraint. Since nearly all sovereign takings have extra-
territorial effects, Sabbatino has been interpreted as stating a doctrine
of compulsory judicial abstention. 35 Although some courts have ap-
plied the doctrine strictly, 36 absolute abstention has not occurred.
Rather, many courts have been unwilling to accept Sabbatino's re-
3i The district court found the doctrine inapplicable on the basis that the expropria-
tion decree violated international law because the action: 1) was motivated by a retaliatory
and not a public purpose; 2) discriminated against U.S. citizens unfairly; and, 3) did not
provide any stated method of compensation for losses. 193 F. Supp. 375, 384-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). There are relatively few nations that do not consider acts of expropria-
tion to be against international law. See 376 U.S. at 428 n.26.
32 376 U.S. at 420.
33 Id. at 428.
34 Id. at 435-36.
35 "The concept of strict territoriality authorizes every state in applying its own
power, to ignore the laws of other nations. There is no real reason for courts in one
nation to defer to a foreign government's acts which wreck or undermine the international
economy." Weston, LAffaire Sabbatino: A Wisful Review, 55 Ky. L.J. 844 (1967). See also
Kline, .1,n Examination of the Competence of National Courts to Prosrbe and Apply International
Law: The Sabbatino Case Revisited, I U.S.F.L. REV. 49 (1966); R. LILLICH, THE PROTECTION OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT: SIX PROCEDURAL STUDIES (1965); Mann, The Legal Consequence of Sab-
batino, 51 VA. L. REV. 604 (1965). Cf Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts:
Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805 (1964).
36i See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d
1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d
68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). See also, Note, Judicial Balancing of Foreign
1988]
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quired forbearance. As will be seen, additional exceptions to the
doctrine were developed.
B. Act of State Exceptions
1. The Hickenlooper Amendment
Congress, unhappy with the result in Sabbatino, responded to the
decision by enacting the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act. 3 7 Specifically, the Amendment was intended to avoid
Sabbatino3 by requiring U.S. courts to apply principles of interna-
tional law to determine sovereign expropriation cases on the merits,
unless the President requests that no such determination be made. 39
Unfortunately, the law was unclear as to how international law prin-
ciples would be either identified or utilized in expropriation cases. 40
Like Bernstein, the Hickenlooper Amendment did not address the
perception of a separation of powers conflict. While legislative or
executive input might not contravene the separation of powers prin-
ciple, the language in Bernstein and the Hickenlooper Amendment
encouraged courts to rely excessively upon executive pronounce-
ments regarding a case's justiciability. Act of state, however, is fore-
most a judicial decision and the appearance of executive
participation in that process treads a thin line with respect to judicial
autonomy. The Hickenlooper Amendment has been the only legisla-
tive attempt to prescribe a zone ofjurisdiction for courts confronted
with act of state claims. 4 1 Given the weakness of congressional ac-
Policy Considerations: Comity and Errors Under the Act of State Doctrine, 35 STAN. L. REv. 327,
332 n.13 (1983).
37 Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1013 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e)(2) (1982)).
38 See S. REP. No. 1188, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3829, 3852. See also 110 CONG. REC. 19,555, 19,557-60 (1964) (remarks of
Sen. Hickenlooper).
39 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)(1982) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States
shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a
determination on the merits giving effect the principles of international law
in a case in which a claim of title or other right is asserted by any party in-
cluding a foreign state (or party claiming through such state) based upon (or
traced through) a confiscation or other taking afterJanuary 1, 1959, by an act
of that state in violation of the principles of international law, including the
principles of compensation and other standards set out in this subsection:
Provided that this subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any case in
which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to international law ... or (2) in
any case with respect to which the President determines that application of
the act of state doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign
policy interests of the United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on
his behalf in that case with the court.
40 For an excellent discussion of the law's shortcomings, see Henkin, Act of State To-
day: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 178-83 (1967) Ihereinafter
Act of State Today].
41 Prior to the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunitites Act of 1976, the law of
sovereign immunity was similar to the law before Hickenlooper. Congress, however, acted
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tion as well as the perceived need to provide litigants with effective
recourse, the Supreme Court developed two additional exceptions to
act of state.
2. The Counterclaim Exception
The possibility of a counterclaim exception for act of state cases
appeared in dictum in Sabbatino,42 in which Justice Harlan noted that
any counterclaim defended on the basis of act of state would be
invalid.
Since the act of state doctrine proscribes a challenge to the validity
of the Cuban expropriation decree in this case, any counterclaim
based on asserted invalidity must fail. Whether a theory of conver-
sion or breach of contract is the proper cause of action under New
York law, the presumed validity of the expropriation is unaffected. 43
Subsequently, the Court held in First National City Bank v. Banco Na-
cional de Cuba44 that a foreign sovereign which availed itself of the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts to pursue a claim waived the right to assert
act of state as a defense.
Banco Nacional sued First National City to recover deposits
placed there as collateral for a sovereign loan. When the new gov-
ernment under Fidel Castro nationalized the banks, City Bank offset
the deposits to repay the loan. The bank tried to keep $1.8 million
of deposited monies in excess of the amount needed to satisfy the
obligation. The district court ruled in favor of City Bank on the
grounds that the Hickenlooper Amendment applied and that the tak-
ing violated customary international law.4 5 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed the lower court, because the taking of
City Bank's branch offices in Cuba occurred within the sovereign's
own territory. 46 The court of appeals interpreted the Hickenlooper
Amendment to apply only to expropriated property that had been
brought back into the United States. It also held that City Bank had
no special claim to any funds in excess of the amount due on the
much more affirmatively in the area of sovereign immunity, clearly prescribing when a
court has jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying notes 63-76. It has been suggested that
similar, improved legislation in the act of state area could eliminate many of the problems
that beset the doctrine. See, e.g., DeBusschere, The Act of State Doctrine:Jiidiciallbsteation or
Obfuscation? 1985 DET. C.L. REV. 1045, 1084. See also De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nica-
ragua, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
42 Although a counterclaim exception was first espoused by Justice Douglas in First
National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), that case involved applica-
tion of the exception in a sovereign immunity case. See infra notes 51-52 and accompany-
ing text.
43 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 439.
44 406 U.S. 759, 768-70 (1972).
45 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York, 270 F. Supp.
1004, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded. 400 U.S. 1019
(1970).
46 431 F.2d at 401-02.
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defaulted loans.47
The Supreme Court expressed no view on the merits of the case
but reversed the Second Circuit and remanded for reconsideration
in light of a Bernstein letter that had been issued after the Second
Circuit opinion.48 On remand, the Second Circuit maintained its
previous position that Bernstein should be narrowly construed and
that act of state prohibited judicial inquiry 49 When the case again
appeared before the Supreme Court, it held that abstention on act of
state grounds would not advance U.S. foreign policy interests and
thus was not required.50 In a five to four decision, the Court held
that act of state did not prohibit City Bank's counterclaim.
Unfortunately, the decision lacked a majority opinion which, in
turn, made the case particularly confusing. Justice Rehnquist, who
wrote for a plurality of three, noted that the act of state concept was
a flexible one which permitted judicial inquiry because of the exist-
ence of the Bernstein letter. Justice Douglas concurred in the result
reached by the Rehnquist plurality, but thought that the decision was
required by an earlier sovereign immunity case that permitted a sov-
ereign's claim to be reduced by offset or counterclaim. 5' Justice
Powell, the fifth vote, concurred on the basis that Sabbatino was too
broad. Powell believed that in the absence of evidence that a court's
exercise ofjurisdiction in an act of state case would actually interfere
with foreign relations, the court was obligated to decide the case on
its merits by utilizing principles of international law.5 2 Justices Bren-
nan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented on the grounds that
"a foreign act of state in certain circumstances was a 'political ques-
tion' not cognizable in our courts." 53
47 Id.
48 400 U.S. at 1019.
49 442 F.2d 530 (1972).
50 406 U.S. at 768.
51 Id. at 772-73. Douglas based his opinion on National City Bank v. Republic of
China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955), which held that sovereign claims could be reduced by coun-
terclaim or by setoff where fair dealing required. Although the case involved a counter-
claim exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine, Douglas' application arguably created
a legitimate exemption for act of state as well.
52 406 U.S. at 775.
5"3 Id. at 787-88. Justice Brennan continued his dissent by noting the inapplicability
of the Bernstein Letter Exception:
Only one-and not necessarily the most important-of those circumstances
concerned the possible impairment of the Executive's conduct of foreign af-
fairs. Even if this factor were absent in this case because of the Legal Advi-
sor's statement of position, it would hardly follow that the act of state
doctrine should not foreclose judicial review of the expropriation of peti-
tioner's properties. To the contrary, the absence of consensus on the appli-
cable international rules, the unavailability of standards from a treaty or
other agreement, the existence and recognition of the Cuban Government,
the sensitivity of the issues to national concerns, and the power of the Execu-
tive alone to effect a fair remedy for all United States citizens who have been
harmed all point toward the existence of a "political question." . . . [Wihen
coupled with the possible consequences to the conduct of our foreign rela-
[VOL. 13
1988] ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
Six justices rejected the Hickenlooper Amendment's so-called
executive suggestion exception. 54 They did not address the Second
Circuit's limiting interpretation of the amendment and thus further
reduced the effect of the statute. 55 With only three justices expressly
adopting Bernstein as an act of state exception, Justice Douglas' coun-
terclaim analogy arguably became another exception to the scope of
act of state. Subsequent cases interpreting the exception have re-
sulted in inconsistent applications of the immunity. 56
3. The Commercial Activity Exception
In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,57 a plurality of
the Court developed an exception to the act of state doctrine. 58 In
Dunhill, the Court held that a Cuban commercial agency's refusal to
repay monies mistakenly paid to it was an exercise of commercial
rather than sovereign authority and thus was not covered under the
doctrine.59 The majority opinion found no evidence of a govern-
mental repudiation of its obligations. 60 Justice White reasoned that
act of state would not apply even if the Cuban government had acted
officially:
[S]ubjecting foreign governments to the rule of law in their commer-
cial dealings presents a much smaller risk of affronting their sover-
eignty than would an attempt to pass on the legality of their
governmental acts. In their commercial capacities, foreign govern-
ments do not exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns. Instead, they
exercise only those powers that can also be exercised by private per-
tions ... these considerations compel application of the act of state doctrine,
notwithstanding the Legal Adviser's suggestion to the contrary. The Execu-
tive Branch, however extensive its powers, cannot by simple stipulation
change a political question into a cognizable claim.
Id. at 788-89 (footnote omitted).
54 The amendment's "executive suggestion" very much resembled the Bernstein Let-
ter exception and further reduced the effect of the Bernstein decision.
55 The court of appeals majority found the amendment applicable only to expropria-
tion cases where the property, in some fashion, found its way into the United States at the
time of the suit. 431 F.2d 394, 401 (2d Cir. 1970).
. 56 Cf. Empressa Cubana Exportadora de Azucary Sus DeRivados v. Lamborm & Co.,
652 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d
875 (2d Cir. 1981); First Nat'l Bank of Boston (Int'l) v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 658 F.2d
895 (2d Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Irving Trust Co., 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir.
1981); Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 658 F.2d 913 (2d
Cir. 1981). At the lower court level, act of state jurisprudence has been made, for the most
part, by the Second Circuit. The six 1981 cases noted above all involved Cuban nationali-
zation decrees and the counterclaim exception. Despite similar facts, the case holdings
were erratic.
For more on the counterclaim exception, see Note, Rehabilitation and Exoneration of the
Act of State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 599, 620 & n.137 (1980); DeBusschere,
supra note 41, at 1083 ("[I]t cannot be said that there is a valid counterclaim exception to
the Act of State Doctrine.").
57 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
58 Only four justices joined this part of the opinion. See 425 U.S. at 695.
59 Id. at 695.
60 Id.
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sons. Subjecting them in connection with such acts to the same rule
of law that apply to private citizens is unlikely to touch very sharply
on "national nerves" . . . . The mere assertion of sovereignty as a
defense to a claim arising out of purely commercial acts by a foreign
sovereign is no more effective if given the label of "Act of State"
than if it is given the label of "sovereign immunity."61
The opinion thus created a new commercial activity exception by
confusing the commercial activity exemption for sovereign immunity
and applying that exception to act of state.
(i) Sovereign Immunity Distinguished from Act of State
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is premised on the belief
that a nation-state cannot be sued without its consent because it is
engaged in a governmental function. Sovereign immunity prevents a
court from exercising jurisdiction over a foreign state. The doctrine
originated from the maxim "the King can do no wrong." There was
no legal right against an authority that had the sovereign power to
make its own laws. 62 Two additional explanations of sovereign im-
munity are respect for equals and, perhaps more important, the in-
ability of one nation to enforce judgments against another.
The act of state doctrine is similar to sovereign immunity in that
both theories operate to protect a sovereign's actions within its own
borders from foreign interference. Act of state differs, however, in
that the judiciary must decide whether a sovereign's acts can be in-
vestigated in a court proceeding which applies domestic or interna-
tional law. It presumes jurisdiction and then inquires whether the
case is justiciable under U.S. law. Sovereign immunity, on the other
hand, is jurisdictional. It precludes institution of a suit against a sov-
ereign without the sovereign's consent when the state has acted pur-
suant to one of its governmental functions. Because a court must
inquire about the legality of the state's particular act before deciding
whether to apply that state's law, act of state has been called a princi-
ple of conflict of laws. 63 In contrast, because it seeks to provide pre-
dictable rules concerning goods in international trade, act of state
has extraterritorial effects and has been called a rule of international
law. 64 The doctrine thus requires judicial forbearance even when a
61 Id. at 703-05.
(2 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
63 The Restatement of Conflict of Laws provides that a court should examine each of
the following factors in determining which state's laws govern: the needs of the interna-
tional system; the policies and interests of the states involved; the justified expectations of
parties; the basic premises underlying an area of law; and, the prospect for uniform results.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
(4 Note, Adjudicating Acts of State in Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns: .4 Political Question
Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 722 (1983). But see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 421 (1964) (rejecting the use of international law standards to inquire into the
validity of public acts committed by a recognized foreign sovereign in its own territory);
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) ("ITihe general and
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foreign sovereign's act might be repugnant to U.S. law and policy,
thereby effectively enforcing the foreign sovereign's act by default."5
Because both act of state and sovereign immunity have in common a
respect for nation-state independence, the two doctrines are often
confused. 6
Sovereign immunity was first explained by the Supreme Court in
The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden.67 Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
distinguished public from private commercial sovereign acts, but
failed to provide guidelines for the distinction. 68 Subsequent courts
seized the "absolute independence" language of the opinion and
created a category of complete protection for sovereign states, ignor-
ing the possibility of a commercial act exception. This idea of abso-
lute immunity stood for nearly 140 years.
After World War II, the United States began to restrict immu-
nity by negotiating. treaties which obligated nations to waive sover-
eign immunity for state-controlled enterprises that were engaged in
commercial business activities. 69 In 1952 the State Department is-
sued a legal advisory letter that expressed the modern view of re-
stricted foreign sovereign immunity. 70 Unrestricted immunity was
thought to be inconsistent with the U.S. policy of subjecting itself to
tort and contract liability concerning merchant vessels. Conse-
quently, the State Department believed that no immunity should be
awarded to actions arising from purely private commercial acts of a
sovereign. Though the State Department letter reincarnated The
Schooner Exchange public-private distinction, it failed to establish
guidelines for differentiating public commercial acts from private
ones.
71
almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be deter-
mined wholly by the law of the country where the act was done.").
65 See Act of State Today, supra note 40, at 178.
66 For a good discussion of the interaction between the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act and the act of state doctrine, see Angulo & Wing, Proposed. Amendments to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 & the Act of State Doctrine, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoC1' 299
(1986).
The confusion surrounding the two doctrines may lead some to conclude that only
one principle is needed. This argument is especially strong where, as with the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, Congress has acted with respect to one principle and not the
other. See, e.g., Hoagland, The Act of State Doctrine: Abandon It, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'"
317, 337-41 (1986).
67 II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns and this
common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse and interchange of
good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in which every
sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete ex-
clusive territorial jurisdiction which has been stated to be an attribute of
every nation.
Id. at 137.
(;! See Setser, The Immniit y oaiver For Sovereign-Controlled Business Enteiprises in 'nited
States Commercial Treaties, in PROCEEDINGS OF AM. Soc. INT'L. L. 89 (1961).
70 26 DET"r Sr. BuLL. 984 (1952).
71 Two tests for classificiation have developed to determine the character of state
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(ii) Questioned Validity of the Commercial Activity Exception
Historically, the commercial activity exception for sovereign im-
munity has not been applied to cases involving an act of state. By
engaging in commercial activities, a foreign state implicitly waives its
sovereign ability to object to another state's exercise of jurisdiction
in matters pertaining to those mercantile actions. Development of a
commercial exception out of the sovereign immunity rubric was thus
both logical and proper. The same cannot be said about a commer-
cial activity exception to act of state. While the Court in Dunhill held
that purely private commercial activity did not require deference
under act of state, the Court did not decide whether the doctrine was
subsumed by sovereign immunity. 72 Whenever a state acts in its own
interest, that nation's sovereignty is being asserted. Thus, the act of
state defense would remain available irrespective of any commercial
component. 7 3 Because expropriation involves questions of both sov-
ereign authority and commercial law, the validity of Dunhill's com-
mercial exception to act of state remains open to debate.7 4
activity. One focuses on the purpose of the governmental activity. Was the act undertaken
to further sovereign objectives? The other test considers the nature of a particular act.
Because most commercial transactions with a government could be argued to further sov-
ereign interests, the purpose test is far broader in classifying activities immune. See Victory
Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360
(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (labeling the purpose test unsatisfactory).
The objective nature test goes too far, however, in denying a sovereign immunity
where that state does in fact engage in a commercial activity such as borrowing from a
private bank. The nature test completely ignores the state's national interest or purposes
for the borrowing. Neither test, therefore, provides a meaningful guide to defining an
activity public or private, the very first step in applying the commercial activity exception.
See Note, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Comniercial Activity: A Conflicts Approach, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1440, 1480-82 (1983) (highlighting the conceptual difficulties in both tests).
In 1976 Congress codified a restrictive theory of immunity in section 1603(d) of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act which provides, "The commercial character of an activ-
ity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976). Immunity thus continues to be deter-
mined haphazardly by how broadly or narrowly a court defines an activity.
72 Compare 425 U.S. 682, 705 n.18 (1976) (majority opinion by justice White) with id.
at 725-26 (MarshallJ., dissenting).
73 See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 1985); Garcia v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 735 F.2d 645, 650 (2d Cir. 1984); Intern. Assn. of Machinists v.
OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982) (rejecting
commercial activity exception to act of state).
74 There appear to be a number of misconceptions if the commercial activity excep-
tion to the act of state is applied to sovereign risk lending. Though the act of borrowing
serves a public function for the sovereign, Justice White's decision would view that action
as a private matter simply because parties other than sovereigns engage in that activity. In
fact, there are relatively few activities in which a private person could not also engage
(witness for example private American contributions to the Nicaraguan Contra move-
ment). Finally, this portion of the opinion ignores the fact that private citizens have federal
and state rights to modify lending contracts through bankruptcy. Instead of applying the
same principles of law to sovereigns, the Dunhill decision, when put in the context of inter-
national lending, actually would place the sovereign in a much more disadvantaged posi-
tion than a private citizen.
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
4. The Treaty Exception
The Sabbatino decision created yet another avenue for judicial
abstention on act of state grounds. When the court refused to deter-
mine the validity of Cuba's seizure and nationalization, it did so on
the ground that international law did not provide a clear basis for
adjudicating the validity of the expropriation. 75
[T]he greater degree of codification or consensus concerning a par-
ticular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the
judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then
focus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of
fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not
inconsistent with the national interest or with international justice
.... Therefore, rather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible
and all-encompassing rule in this case, we decide only that the Judi-
cial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property
within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government extant
and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a
treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal
principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates cus-
tomary international law. 7b
The inference drawn from the opinion is that if nations, through
treaty or other agreement, could decide applicable principles gov-
erning their behavior, domestic courts could try disputes without
fear of the act of state doctrine's prohibition.
Having apparently paved the way for international law to em-
power domestic courts to consider the appropriateness of a taking,
the Sabbatino Court identified expropriation as an issue subject to
such divided opinions that the treaty exception could not be ap-
plied. 77 Twenty-four years later, the same divergence of opinion
concerning sovereign debt expropriation and international law still
exists. By and large, the contentions center on whether an expropri-
ating state must pay compensation to the injured party. 78 Interna-
tional law is based in large part on customs recognized by a majority
of nations. With debt expropriation, there is disagreement over the
recognition that should be afforded customary law. Many develop-
ing nations are coming to view debt restructure, and perhaps repudi-
ation, as an adjunct to their development. Repayment of massive
75 376 U.S. 398, 428-31 (1964).
76 Id. at 428.
77 Id,
78 Commentators have argued that takings without compensation violate interna-
tional law. See S. FRIEDMAN, EXPROPRIATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 206-11 (1953);
Dawson & Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and Effective ". .4 'niversal Standard of Coinpensation?, 30
FORDHAM L. REV. 727 (1962); THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (R. Lillich ed. 1972). Compare RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 172 (1965) (compensation not a rule of international law). See West
v. Multibanco Commermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 2483
(1987) (held: Mexico's changes in bank regulations did not constitute an expropriation
compensable under international law since there was no taking).
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debt is seen as a device to keep developing countries economically
immature. Further, the issue of how to factor international law into
U.S. jurisprudence is a question still open to debate. 79
Even assuming judicial competence, the remedial issue of order-
ing compensation is also problematic. Unless an expropriating state
has substantial assets within U.S. boundaries, a court order of com-
pensation may be worth little if anything.80 In addition, even nations
that have signed treaties concerning applicable legal principles have
balked where application of the agreement has been deemed to have
a potentially harmful effect. 81 Thus, the effect of the treaty excep-
tion must also be called into question.82
Courts faced with act of state cases encounter conceptual diffi-
culties not only with the doctrine itself, but also with each of the five
exceptions: 1) the Bernstein Letter exception; 2) the Hickenlooper
Amendment; 3) the counterclaim exception; 4) the commercial activ-
ity exception; and 5) the treaty exception. Although Sabbatino stated
the doctrine's theoretical origins, the decision did not outline which
factors lower courts should consider when making the threshold de-
cision to abstain from applying U.S. law. The exceptions reflect the
difficulties that the Supreme Court has had with property seizures by
foreign nations. When the highest court is uneasy with a doctrine
and fails to clarify its basis, it is not surprising that lower courts are
confused completely. How should courts balance the desire to pro-
vide a forum for parties allegedly injured by a sovereign's acts with
the principles of international comity and executive conduct of for-
eign policy? Many commentators have called for a reformulation of
79 See, e.g., Gerber, Beyond Balancing: International Law Restraints on the Reach of Interna-
tional Laws, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 185-221 (1984). One could argue that acts of state are
questions of domestic, procedural law and not international law issues. If this contention
were accepted, the next analytical step would be much easier: once within the realm of
domestic law, the question of whether the defense of expropriation is legitimate, becomes
one of federal common law and is subject to review and change by any of the three
branches of government. Cf Bowett, Claims Between States and Private Entities: The Twilight
Zone of International Law, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 929 (1986); Butcher, The Consonance of United
States Positions on International Law with Advisory Opinions of the International Court ofJustice, 30
How. L. J. 45-91 (1987); Henkin, International Law as law in the United States, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1555 (1984); Leich, Coitempora-, Practice of the United States Relating to International Law,
81 AM.J. INT'L L. 405 (1987).
8() Admittedly, an adverse judgment against a foreign sovereign in an American court
may provide a basis for forcing the U.S. government to help individual plaintiffs in seeking
recovery. However, it is suggested that judicial declarations of liability would do more to
inflame a sovereign than executive intervention before judgment.
8I See Kennedy, Treaty Intepretation by the Executive Branch: The ABJ! Treaty and the "Star
ll'ar" Testing aid Development, 80 AM.J. INT'L L. 854 (1986); Miller, The President and Faithful
Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 389, 402-06 (1987).
82 Cf. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't, 729 F.2d 422,
425-28 (6th Cir. 1984) (the act of state doctrine did not preclude the court from adjudicat-
ing an American Corporation's expropriation claim against Ethiopian government in light
of standards set out in the treaty).
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the standards used in deciding when to apply the doctrine.83
II. International Sovereign Debt: Problems for Act of State
The historical roots of act of state lie in transactions involving
expropriated tangible property. Originally developed from accounts
receivable deals, 'the doctrine could be applied effectively, depending
upon the location of the subject goods. If products were outside the
Untied States, a domestic court could not attempt to adjudicate the
validity of a foreign sovereign's seizure of the property. Property
situs has been a court's first step in determining whether a claim is
prohibited by the act of state doctrine.
A situs test, however, is inappropriate in cases involving sover-
eign debt. Debt is an intangible which gives a creditor the right to
enforce another's obligation by judicial action.84 In Alfred Dunhill,85
the Court noted correctly that Cuba's act of state defense would not
apply because the tangible property in question, cigars, was located
in New York and thus outside the foreign sovereign's territory.
Property located outside a sovereign's borders did not give a country
the same expectation of dominion through expropriation as property
within the foreign state's geographic territory. 86 When a case in-
volves the right to repayment of a loan, however, the Court's deter-
mination of debt situs is an act of whim rather than reason. Act of
state is premised on notions of inter-jurisdictional deference and rec-
iprocity as these relate to a nation's competence to prescribe rules of
law. Debt situs is a function of these inter-jurisdictional factors and
can be determined only by examining both foreign State and forum
State (U.S.) interests.
A. The Concept of Debt Situs
There have been two generally stated methods of determining
debt situs in act of state cases. The first test was articulated in Harris
v. Balk,8 7 in which the Court held that debt clings to the debtor.
Thus a court could assert jurisdiction over a debt only if it could
claim personal jurisdiction over the debtor. The Harris Court recog-
nized that intangibles, unlike real or tangible personal property, have
no physical attributes that would assist a court in determining loca-
83 The writers are fairly split between those who believe that the doctrine serves a
legitimate function and should continue to be used, and others who call for the doctrine's
abolition entirely. Compare Act of State Today, supra note 40, with Hoagland, supra note 66.
84 See Note, Debt Situs & The Act of State Doctrine: A Proposal for a 1ore Flexible Standard,
49 ALB. L. REV. 647, 648 n.8 (1985).
85 425 U.S. 682 (1975).
86; See Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1027 (1972) (government cannot alter the legal status of parties concerning property
located beyond government's territory).
87 198 U.S. 215 (1906).
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tion. The Court expressly refused to attempt to determine debt
situs:
[T]he situs is unimportant. It is not a question of possession in the
foreign state, for possession cannot be taken of a debt or of the obli-
gation to pay it, as tangible property might be taken possession of.88
Though much of the Harris decision was overruled in Shaffer v. Heit-
ner,89 the portion of its analysis on debt situs remains good law.90
In Menendez v. Saks & Co.,91 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit applied the Harris debt situs test and found that a foreign
sovereign had no power to enforce or collect a debt unless it was
located within that sovereign's territory. 92 Because U.S. courts had
jurisdiction over the debtor, the court located the debt in the United
States and refused to apply the act of state doctrine. 93 On appeal,
the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision except that
portion on debt situs. 94 The Court assumed that jurisdiction over a
debt was an either-or proposition between the United States and a
foreign sovereign. It did not consider the possibility of both coun-
tries asserting jurisdiction.
Can a debt be located in more than one place? With intangible
property such as debt, a foreign state can claim jurisdiction because
the debtor, whether the sovereign itself or a sovereign-approved en-
tity, is present in the country. U.S. courts can also claim jurisdiction
over a dispute on contract principles, because most sovereign debt-
ors typically consent to U.S. jurisdiction in the loan documenta-
tion. 95 Thus, a case for two countries claiming domain can be made
without obstacle. Claimed jurisdiction over a debtor, therefore, does
88 Id. at 223.
8) 433 U.S. 186, 212 n.39 (held: the Harris attachment of a debt to obtain jurisdiction
did not meet the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945)).
90 See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
91l 485 F.2d 1355, 1364-65 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'don othergrounds sub noan. Alfred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
92 485 F.2d at 1364.
93 Id. at 1365-66.
94 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 690 (1976).
95 There are numerous early domestic cases that fix debt situs in the state of the
creditor's domicile. See, e.g., Texas v, New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965), McCulloch v.
Franchise Tax Board, 61 Cal. 2d 186, 390 P.2d 412, 37 Cal. Rptr. 636 (1964), reh ig denied,
379 U.S. 984 (1965); Fenton v. Edwards & Johnson, 126 Cal. 43, 46, 58 P. 320 (1899).
Most of these cases placed the situs with the creditor'to enable the creditor's state of domi-
cile to tax property or income derived from the property. See also Waite v. Waite, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 325, 329, 492 P.2d 133, 137, 6 Cal. 3d 461 (1972). The 11'aite Court also noted that
when an issue involved jurisdiction to compel an obligor to pay a claimant, personal juris-
diction over the debtor became the key determinant. Id.
One might also challenge the actual "consent to jurisdiction" involved in many sover-
eign loan contracts. Inasmuch as many debtor nations have no true alternative to private
borrowing, the claim that such a provision was entered into willingly and knowingly is
subject to question.
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not resolve the initial question of debt situs, or the more important
issue of whether act of state requires judicial abstention.
A second debt situs test, known as the complete fruition require-
ment, was developed in Tabaclera Severiano Jorge v. Standard Cigar
Co.,96 in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit required
that a determination be made whether a foreign sovereign had physi-
cal control over a debt at the time of expropriation. Absent physical
control, a taking did not come to "complete fruition" and the act of
state doctrine did not bar a U.S. court from hearing argument. 9 7
Tabaclera involved accounts receivable on a sale of goods. The court
of appeals based its decision on the physical control of the goods
rather than on any principle or theory concerning intangible prop-
erty. Under Tabaclera, courts could work legal witchcraft in order to
place intangible property at their doorsteps. 98
Recently, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York modified the Harris test for locating the situs of a sover-
eign debt. In Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica,9 9 the
court examined the debtor state's reasonable expectations of domin-
ion over property. Because the loan documentation in the case
stated that the debt was payable in New York, the court rejected the
Costa Rican bank's act of state defense and found that the incidents
of debt were located in New York. 10 0 Judge Motley justified the
96 392 F.2d 706, 714-16 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
97 For an excellent discussion of the two tests and the problems generated by debt
situs rules generally, see Note, The Act of State Doctrine: Resolving Debt Situs Confusion, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 594 (1986). See also United Bank, Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868
(2d Cir. 1976)(the inability of a foreign state to complete an expropriation within its terri-
torial borders reduces the state's expectations of dominion over the property; judicial dis-
position, therefore, is less likely to vex the foreign state).
98 See Lowenfeld, In Search of the Intangible: A Comment on Shaffer v. Heitner, 53
N.Y.U.L. REV. 102 (1978)(arguing that intangibles have no situs at all and that debt is
located wherever personal jurisdiction can be obtained).
1) 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
100 Id. at 884. Cf Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) in which
the Fifth Circuit found a debt located in Mexico and abstained from hearing the case.
Callejo was a U.S. citizen who purchased certificates of deposit from Bancomer, a Mexican
bank. The certificates were denominated in dollars but payable in Mexico. The country's
1982 monetary crisis led the government to enact official exchange controls which re-
quired all banks to pay foreign obligations in dollars. The regulations also set a specified
rate of exchange that was well below the market rate. With the value of the certificates
reduced substantially, the Callejos alleged breach of contract. The court of appeals framed
the issue as whether "the ties of the debt to the foreign country [were] sufficiently close
that [the court] will antagonize the foreign government by not recognizing its acts." 764
F.2d at 1124. The court continued:
[hiere, the incidents of the certificates of deposit clearly place them in Mex-
ico. The certificates of deposit were issued by Bancomer's Nuevo Laredo
branch, where the Callejo's deposits were carried, and called for payment in
Mexico. This grouping of contacts, when viewed through the gloss of the
policies underlying the act of state doctrine, places the debt in Mexico and
calls for the application of Mexican law.
Id. (footnote omitted). Because adjudication of the contract claim would call into question
the validity of the regulations, the court found the act of state doctrine applicable.
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court's decision to hear the case by implying that the borrower, a
bank wholly-owned by the government of Costa Rica, had somehow
contractually waived its sovereign rights. "It can hardly be said that
this court's judgment shall frustrate the foreign state's reasonable
expectations of dominion over the legal rights involved therein so as
to vex our amicable relations with that foreign nation."10 The very
converse of this was true, however.
An incidents of debt analysis ignores the very fact that a sover-
eign borrower's circumstances may have changed and led the debtor
country to take drastic economic action to carry out a principle. Judi-
cial review in the face of extraordinary measures, such as the Costa
Rican Central Bank's intervention in Libra Bank, denies recognition
of the sovereign. The decision not only endangers relations between
Costa Rica and the United States, but also acts as a signal to other
nations that U.S. creditor interests take precedence over a debtor
country's legitimate efforts to handle threats to its economy. Such
actions clearly present the potential for vexing foreign relations.
B. Debt Situs Confusion: Allied Bank
The flawed logic of applying act of state's situs requirement to a
pure lending transaction again was exposed in Allied Bank Interna-
tional v. Banco Creditor Agricola de Cartago, 102 which involved facts iden-
tical to those in Libra Bank. Allied was agent for a lending syndicate
of thirty-nine banks which made loans to three banks wholly-owned
by the Republic of Costa Rica.' 0 3 The three borrowing banks exe-
cuted a series of promissory notes payable to syndicate members.
The notes were denominated in U.S. dollars and payable in New
York. Additionally, each note contained a provision subjecting the
Costa Rican banks to New York jurisdiction.
The Costa Rican banks made timely payments on the notes until
July 1981. At that time the Costa Rican Central Bank, which had
direct control of the three borrowing banks, issued regulations that
suspended all external debt payments. By November 1981, the Costa
Rican government blocked all payment of foreign debts in U.S. dol-
lars. The lenders declared a default and sued the borrowers in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The dis-
trict court found in favor of the Costa Rican banks on act of state
grounds without discussion or application of debt situs rules. 0 4
lo! 570 F.Supp. at 884 (emphasis added).
102 566 F.Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473
U.S. 934 (1985).
103 566 F.Supp. at 1442. For a discussion of syndicated lending, see Knight, Loan Par-
ticipation Agreements: Catching Up With Contract Law, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 587.
104 566 F.Supp. at 1444. The court also held that the execution of promissory notes
constituted a commercial activity within the meaning of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act and thus the action was excepted from the defense of sovereign immunity. Id. In
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Judge Griesa rested the opinion on Sabbatino's separation of powers
rationale:
A judgment in favor of Allied in this case would constitute a judicial
determination that defendants must make payments contrary to the
directives of their governments. This puts the judicial branch of the
United States at odds with policies laid down by a foreign govern-
ment on an issue deemed by that government to be of central impor-
tance. Such an act by this court risks embarrassment to the relations
between the executive branch of the United States and the govern-
ment of Costa Rica. 10 5
During the summer of 1983, while the appeal was still pending,
all but one of the thirty-nine syndicate members agreed to
reschedule the debt. Both the Costa Rican government and the
country's central bank signed the refinancing agreement. The thirty-
ninth syndicate member, Fidelity Union Trust of New Jersey, refused
to reschedule and demanded that Allied, as syndicate manager, bring
appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The Court of Appeals (Allied I) affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion, rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the act of state doctrine
did not apply because the debt was located outside Costa Rica.' 0 6
The court compared Costa Rica's suspension of external debt obliga-
tions to reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 0 7
Thus, the country's actions were found to be consistent with U.S. law
and policy. The decision returned act of state analysis to the days of
Underhill and considerations of international comity. Banks would no
longer be able to structure their loan agreements to assure enforce-
ment in the United States. The Allied I decision thus called the very
enforceability of sovereign debt into question.
With Justice Department support for its position, Allied Bank
petitioned for and was granted a rehearing. In a throwback to Bern-
stein, the department's amicus curiae brief argued that the Second Cir-
cuit's decision was based on a misunderstanding of U.S. policy.
Unlike Bernstein, however, neither the Justice Department nor the
State Department had articulated a position on the role of private
sovereign debt restructuring previously. The government's brief de-
scribed the Allied opinion as a cloud over rescheduling discussions:
[A]n important element in the functioning of this process has been
the willingness of commercial banks to reschedule debt and to pro-
vide credit to countries undertaking adjustment efforts. The confi-
dence of lenders in the enforceability of their loan agreements
payable in New York is critical to their willingness to extend interna-
tional credit. However, this Court's opinion introduces significant
refusing to exempt Costa Rica's actions under act of state, the court essentially disap-
proved of Dunhill's commercial activity exception.
105 Id.
106 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 30
(1985).
107 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982)).
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uncertainties into the process of making and interpreting interna-
tional financial agreements, leaving unclear, to debtors and creditors
alike, the circumstances under which United States courts will give
effect to a foreign government's action limiting payments of obliga-
tions in the United States. Consequently, the United States Govern-
ment believes that the Court's opinion may well discourage
commercial lenders from providing essential new financing and
could adversely affect the taking of adjustment measures. If these
developments were to occur, the orderly resolution of debt
problems could be seriously jeopardized. 10 8
At rehearing, the court reversed its earlier decision and awarded
summary judgment for Allied (Allied 11).109 The court paid particular
attention to the portion of the government brief which took issue
with the prior court's interpretation of U.S. foreign policy regarding
Costa Rica. Rescheduling, the government argued, was a coopera-
tive venture between contracting parties. Costa Rica's repayment
regulations amounted to a unilateral attempt to alter its commercial
debt and was thus inconsistent with international cooperation advo-
cated by both the International Monetary Fund and U.S. policy." I 0
The court was convinced by these arguments, stating that "[i]n
light of the government's elucidation of its position, we believe that
our earlier interpretation of United States policy was wrong.'''11
The court then applied 'the Harris debt situs test, finding "Costa
Rica's potential jurisdiction over the debt ... not sufficient to locate
the debt there for the purpose of act of state doctrine analysis.' 12 In
reaching its conclusion, the court noted three specific U.S. interests:
1) the orderly resolution of international debt problems; 2) the inter-
ests of the United States continuing as a major source of private in-
ternational credit; and 3) principles of contract law.' 13 "Acts of
foreign governments purporting to have extraterritorial effect-and
consequently, by definition, falling outside the scope of the act of
state doctrine-should be recognized by the courts only if they are
consistent with the law and policy of the U.S."' '4
The court in Allied I properly considered Sabbatino's balancing
requirement. The court's bankruptcy analogy not only acknowledged
the sovereign's efforts to address its monetary crisis, but it also al-
108 Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae 6-7, Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola
de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984)[hereinafter Government Briefn. The brief was sup-
ported jointly by the Department of Justice, State, and Treasury, and by the Federal Re-
serve Board.
109 757 F.2d at 518.
1 10 "While the parties may agree to renegotiate conditions of payment, the underlying
obligations to pay nevertheless remain valid and enforceable." Government Brief, supra
note 108, at 7.
11' 757 F.2d at 520.
112 Id. at 522.
113 Id.
114 Id.
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lowed the court to balance those interests against the concerns of the
Allied lending syndicate.
The court's findings in Allied II were chauvinistic in the sense
that only U.S. creditor interests were addressed. There was neither
explanation nor justification for the court's applying territorial limi-
tations to the Costa Rican debt. In effect, the holding required sov-
ereign debtors to violate their own domestic laws in favor of a U.S.
lender. Costa Rica promulgated its regulations out of need, not ani-
mosity. Suspension of debt payments was a last-ditch effort to
restructure a crippling economic situation. Under Allied H's interpre-
tation, any effort not approved by either U.S. banking interests or the
federal government would be against U.S. policy and thus act of state
would not apply.
The Allied II court failed to consider the policies behind Costa
Rica's repayment regulations and the reasons why those actions were
taken unilaterally. The decision was extraordinary because the exec-
utive branch deemed it appropriate not to participate in debt restruc-
turing talks between private banks and the government of Costa
Rica.' 15 Despite the court's suggestion to the contrary, Costa Rica's
actions were sovereign acts. Once the regulations were announced,
the transaction ceased to be a purely private affair. A sovereign en-
tity had acted in its own best interests. The fact that the sovereign's
actions posed a substantial risk to U.S. corporate citizens should be a
proper concern of the court. The risk also should be a proper con-
cern of the branch of government charged with conducting foreign
policy, the executive. Costa Rica's actions made the matter an issue
115 To its credit, the government did recognize Costa Rica's attempt to restructure its
debt and even approved foreign aid despite the fact that Costa Rica's failure to pay its
foreign debt triggered the provisions of section 6 2 0(q) of the Foreign Assistance Act, 22
U.S.C. § 2370(q) (1976), which prohibits U.S. aid to any country in default on loan pay-
ments to the United States unless the President advises the Congress that "assistance to
such country is in the national interest .... " Pursuant to the statutory requirement, the
President, through the Secretary of State, certified to Congress:
In accordance with ... the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 .I have deter-
mined that it is in the national interest to furnish assistance under the Act in
Fiscal Year 1983 to Costa Rica, notwithstanding that the Government of
Costa Rica is more than six months in default in payment to the United
States of principal and interest on loans made under the Act.
Continuation of U.S. assistance to Costa Rica is consistent with the com-
mitment of this administration and in Congress to help Costa Rica regain
economic viability ....
Letter from Secretary of State George P. Schultz to the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, Thomas P. O'Neill,Jr., 129 CONG. REC. H1461 (daily ed. March 21, 1983)(exec-
utive communication no. 671 referred from Speaker's table)(source available from
author).
In addition to providing economic assistance (more than $320 million in aggregate
aid during fiscal 1982, 1983, and 1984), the U.S. Government did participate in the
rescheduling of Costa Rica's intergovernmental debt. Hemings and Markup Before the Sub-
comnt. on Ilestern Hemisphere Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Review of Proposed
Economic and Secuiqy Assistance Requests for Latin Anierica and the Canibbean, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 23 (1983).
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of foreign policy whether the U.S. government wanted it to be or
not.
The Justice Department brief in Allied H did not outline any ex-
ecutive plan of active involvement in the rescheduling talks. Instead,
the brief suggested that the administration's position on private sov-
ereign debt was not inconsistent with the desires of the United States
either to aid in restructuring Costa Rica's intergovernmental obliga-
tions or to provide foreign aid to the Central American nation. The
court meekly accepted these statements without examination. Forty
years after Bernstein, the executive branch could still lead the judiciary
down a path without any explanation of its decision.
Acts of state involving intangible property require judicial re-
thinking because the desired effect-to limit the role of courts in for-
eign policy-is not accomplished. Rather, the real effect of the
doctrine is to shield the executive branch's foreign policy positions
from scrutiny of any kind. Unlike instances involving tangible prop-
erty located outside the sovereign's territory, Costa Rica had, and
continues to have, expectations of dominion over its external debt.
A government's inability to manage its economic affairs not only
threatens that nation's creditors, but also risks the stability of the
debtor nation. By giving little consideration to Costa Rica's reasons
for its repayment moratorium, the Allied H court ignored the policy
considerations underlying the doctrine and created a foreign policy
of nonrecognition of the sovereign acts of another country. In this
instance, the threat to amicable relations between a debtor nation
and the United States is real and substantial.
The economic relationship between the United States and other
countries is also at risk from the precedent established in Allied H. If
a U.S. court refuses to recognize one nation's sovereign acts, why
should another country expect different treatment where its laws and
regulations are involved? Would there be any reason for another
nation to give credence to U.S. sovereign acts that have extraterrito-
rial effects? The Allied H decision permits the administration to dis-
rupt the best mechanism for resolving international debt problems
and for maintaining amicable foreign relations: cooperative discus-
sions which involve the debtor nation, creditor banks, and the U.S.
government.
III. Toward Judicial Participation: Reconsidering Act of State
The decision to hear a case involving sovereign debt is a polit-
ical judgment and one that the judiciary is ill-equipped to make. The
executive branch, with its wealth of diplomatic and intelligence infor-
mation, is far more capable of predicting how another nation might
respond to the judiciary's investigation of the country's sovereign
decisions concerning its debt obligations. In addition, the executive
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branch is also best-suited to avoid international misunderstandings
that could be caused by a court's ruling adverse to a foreign sover-
eign's interests. Yet despite its power, the executive often does not
become involved in alleged wrongful expropriation cases. When the
administration does enter the process, it usually does so only on the
fringe-by issuing curt statements that U.S. foreign policy interests
will or will not be affected. 1 6 In the absence of a Bernstein Letter or
some other executive acknowledgement as in Allied H, a court can do
no more than speculate about the ramifications of making a decision.
Even where the court adheres to the executive's recommendations in
a particular matter, a decision to try a case using domestic law likely
would have consequences for U.S. foreign policy. Undoing the harm
to foreign affairs from a decision adverse to a foreign sovereign
might be impossible.
Current act of state analysis presents thejudiciary with three bad
choices: 1) apply U.S. law and risk insulting the sovereign by an ad-
verse ruling and possibly damaging U.S. foreign relations; 2) apply
foreign law and deny an aggrieved lender of its expected and agreed-
upon forum,' 17 or 3) refuse to apply either U.S. law or foreign law
and effectively abstain from hearing the dispute.' 18 None of these
choices gives effect to the vital concept of respect for comity among
nations, while all involve the cost of denying an aggrieved lender a
remedy.
A. Abstention as a Statement of Foreign Policy' 19
In the United States, recognition of the act of state doctrine
arose from a concern with international relations and a desire to pre-
clude the judiciary from making foreign policy. It was thought that
courts posed less of a risk to foreign affairs if they refused to act.
Abstention, however, is not the best way to develop amicable inter-
national relations. In refusing to hear argument and evidence of an
expropriation, a court in effect makes foreign policy when it accepts
without examination the validity of the foreign sovereign's act. One
important question that courts should ask is what effect abstention
will have on subsequent cases. Judicial policy-making has long been
a species of federal common law. Until Erie v. Tompkins 121 the
Supreme Court routinely made common law without considering the
I I16 But see supra note 115.
117 See suipra note 8. TFhis choice may result in a fai accompli in flavor of' the foreign
sovereign. It is doubtful that the Fbreign sovereign's law would invalidate a state act like
debt postponement or nonpayment.
11 This seems to be the preferred choice of many courts.
tIl: While the same arguments concerning foreign policy could be made for traditional
expropriations cases, the discussion in this section is intended to bc limited to sovereign
debt cases.
120 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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possibility that such decisions might interfere with either state sover-
eignty or with the idea of coequal branches of government.' 2 1
An important function of courts is to provide a forum for parties
claiming injury. In Sabbatino, the Court weighed this purpose against
the likelihood that judicial inquiry might offend a foreign govern-
ment and thus affect foreign relations with that country. Courts
faced with alleged acts of state had to conduct a three-part inquiry to
determine the scope of review: 1) whether review would offend a
foreign sovereign; 2) whether the executive's foreign policy efforts
would be compromised if review was granted; and 3) assuming re-
view, whether it would provide a basis for effective relief. Under the
act of state doctrine, an affirmative answer to either of the first two
questions or a negative response to the third meant that the court
should refuse to hear the case.
A triple inquiry to decide justiciability not only consumes judi-
cial resources unwisely, but also fails to achieve its stated purpose of
avoiding judicial consideration of foreign policy issues. Few would
question whether any court decision on the merits would likely of-
fend a foreign government. Further, there are no governing statutes
or legislative history a court can examine to determine the validity of
a foreign government's actions. The Allied I court's analogy to fed-
eral bankruptcy law has been the only attempt to relate sovereign
debt with another related area of law.
Takings without just compensation have long been recognized
as violations of international law, 122 yet Banco Nacional failed to in-
struct courts on how to factor international law into the decision-
making process.12 3 There continues to be widespread disagreement
in interpreting applicable international dispute resolution princi-
ples.' 2 4 It is thus possible that international law is in sufficient disar-
ray such that it cannot produce an effective remedy based upon any
acceptable principles. This is particularly the case with sovereign
debt. Many developing debtor nations see bank demands for auster-
ity as conditions precedent to additional extensions of credit as
unacceptable. ' 25
1'21 Although some post-Eie cases suggest that this type ofjudicial law making, in the
absence of other governmental advice, violates the spirit of the separation of powers prin-
ciple, it is virtually unquestioned that courts can and do make law by both acting and
refusing to act.
122 See D. WEIGEL & B. WESTON, VALUATION UPON THE DEPRIVATION OF FOREIGN EN-
TERPRISE: A POLICY-ORIENTED APPROACH To THE PROBLEM OF COMPENSATION UNDER IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 4 (R. Lillich ed. 1972).
123 Indeed, the Court noted that the doctrine even applied to acts which violated inter-
national law "in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding con-
trolling legal principles .... ' 376 U.S. at 428.
124 See spra notes 75-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of what constitutes
customary international law.
125 Brazil, for example, stopped paying interest on about $67 billion of its foreign
bank debt on February 20, 1987, as a means of developing some leverage in debt restruc-
[VOL. 13
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
Professor Henkin has suggested that the Court in Banco Nacional
intended to announce a more limited concept of act of state, namely,
that the doctrine does not give parties any:
rights, remedies or defenses against a foreign government for its vi-
olations of international law ... that while international law is part
of the law of the United States, the law of the United States has no
application to what Castro did in Cuba .... Whether and how the
United States wished to react to such violations are domestic, polit-
ical questions: the courts will not assume any particular reaction,
remedy, or consequence. 126
The implication that courts should not respond at all to foreign ex-
propriations is troublesome. Given the limits of international dis-
pute resolution, in the absence ofjudicial inquiry there is no effective
basis for relief.' 27 Henkin's explanation leaves courts with only one
choice-to risk violating the separation of powers principle by seek-
ing executive pronouncements that review would not interrupt for-
eign policy.
The administration frequently refuses to announce its position
in private commercial affairs. Executive silence, however, should not
be interpreted to mean that a court must refrain from exercising ju-
risdiction. 12 8 A court's refusal to hear an expropriation case consti-
tutes both implicit acknowledgement of a taking and a foreign policy
position that this country will not inquire further. It is therefore spe-
cious to suggest that abstention is the best means to avoid the court's
making foreign policy. The Supreme Court recognized this in Banco
Nacional by allowing the creation of a variety of exceptions.' 2 9
B. American Banking Law: Beyond Executive Discretion
A more helpful view of the act of state doctrine should concen-
trate on the sovereign acts of the United States. The executive's un-
fettered discretion to intervene in matters involving sovereign debt
permits it to avoid addressing important issues of national policy by
hiding behind the judiciary's abstention shield. Act of state should
be reinterpreted to recognize the role of judicial review in oversee-
ing the executive's obligation to act as an intermediary in restructur-
ing foreign sovereign debts. The underlying principles of the
doctrine can be met only by a court providing limited review of sov-
ereign repayment cases under U.S. law and, where appropriate, or-
turing talks. It has requested $10.4 billion in additional bank credits to help finance inter-
est payments through 1989. U.S. bankers know that unless they reach some accord by
years-end, their regulators might require them to start writing down their shaky credits.
See Bank Creditors Outline Stance on Brazil Debt, Wall St. J., October 5, 1987, at 16. col. 3.
126 L. HENNIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTITUTION 223-24 (1972)(footnote
omitted).
127 See sipra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
128 See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
12,) See supra notes 42-83 and accompanying text.
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dering the executive to explain its position on participation (or lack
of it) in working to resolve the sovereign debtor's repayment
problems. Such an approach would permit the courts to weigh the
executive's position on foreign policy vis-i-vis sovereign debt against
a creditor claimant's interests and expectation of judicial protection
of contractually-created rights.
The allocation of foreign affairs powers presents a major stum-
bling block in revising act of state theory to advocate judicial activ-
ism. The Constitution does not provide any branch of government
with an express power to conduct foreign relations principally. Con-
gress is given the authority to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions, to prescribe offenses against the law of nations, and to declare
war.13 0 The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate,
has the capacity to make treaties and appoint ambassadors.'13
Though the Constitution envisions cooperation between these two
branches, it is generally acknowledged that the President has the pri-
mary role in conducting foreign policy.1 32 One of the problems with
this interpretation is the degree of discretion vested in the executive.
Courts cannot order the President to do anything that the office has
not been required to do either by Congress or under the Constitu-
tion. 3 3 The idea of executive discretion in foreign affairs has pre-
vented courts from examining executive pronouncements of policy
in cases of international debt restructuring.
It goes without saying that sovereign debt repayment is a matter
of foreign affairs. Although affairs between nations principally in-
volve political relations conducted by the political branches (i.e., ex-
ecutive and legislative), it would be remiss to discount or ignore the
role of the judiciary. The ordinary business of courts can affect U.S.
foreign relations.' 34 Judges have the power to involve their courts ill
foreign affairs in a number of ways: in cases arising under the Con-
stitution, laws or treaties of the United States, by review of federal
administrative agency activities that effect other nations, and by re-
view of the actual foreign activities of administrative agencies.': 5 In
sovereign debt cases, courts must balance review power in a foreign
affairs matter with the court's function as arbiter in the process of
resolving specific disputes between parties. Unfortunately, many
courts have been less willing to review decisions by the political
branches even when a failure to do so would prevent resolution of a
.o U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. See I. HENKIN, sufr note 126, al 16.
1 U.S. CONST. arl. II, § 2. cl. 2.
132 L. HENKIN, su/pra 1101C 126, at 37-38.
133 Professor Henkin also did not rule out the possibility ihat coullts could assume
authoritv to hear an expropriation case. Congress could legislate that the courts should
refuse to recognize the sovereign act, or should give a remedy against lie sovereign. id. al
224.
3- See id. at 205.
1:5 See U.S. ('ONST. art. Ill, § 3.
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conflict. '3 6
One notable exception to judicial review of political action in-
volves foreign affairs that allegedly violate individual rights. One ag-
grieved in person or property by an act of a political branch can
make a constitutional challenge, most often alleging that the political
action deprives one of property or person without due process of
law. 13 7 It seems plausible that U.S. banks could argue that executive
inaction or refusal to participate in debt restructuring talks, led to a
taking without due process, especially when given the fact that most
sovereign lending contracts provide that U.S. law governs.
For the most part, however, courts have cited foreign affairs as
an area akin to political questions 138 and "elevated judicial absten-
tion to a principle that courts will not decide political questions."' 3 9
Other than its acceptance and use in the common law, the political
question doctrine, like act of state, is far from being a well-justified
or well-explained concept. Not only has the constitutional basis for
the doctrine been questioned, but the "remedy" of abstention is also
uncertain.
In Baker v. Carr,140 Justice Brennan wrote that courts could rec-
ognize a political question because it would involve a constitutionally
textual commitment to a political department; a lack ofjudicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolution of the dispute;
the impossibility of deciding a case without an initial determination
of a kind which went beyond judicial discretion; or, the possibility
that a decision would disrespect another branch of government.' 4'
The Court also acknowledged, however, that it would be
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches for-
eign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field
seem invariably to show a discriminating analysis of the particular
question posed, in terms of the history of its management by the
136 Scholars still dispute whether courts have constitutional authority to declare acts of
Congress unconstitutional, or whether courts have developed such a power on their own.
Cf Wechsler, Toward Autral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959), with
L. HAND, iHE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958). That courts do make law by declaring such acts
constitutional or not, is undisputed.
137 For an early application of the concept, see Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1935). See also Ltuftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945
(1967), Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967)(dis-
senting opinions of Justices Stewart and Douglas, urging justiciability of constitutional and
other questions surrounding the Vietnam War).
138 For an excellent general discussion of the political question doctrine, see Scharpf,
Judicial Review and the Political Question: . Functional Aialysis, 75 YALE LI.J. 517 (1966).
1.39 L. HENKIN, supra note 126, at 210. Though the Court in Sabbatii never stated
exactly what required abstention in act of state cases, it noted that the doctrine was not
required by sovereignty, international law, the political question doctrine, or anything in
the Constitution but that the doctrine had philosophical underpinnings in each of these
areas. Thus, it would not be error to examine any of these underpinnings. See supra note
29.
14o 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
1-1 Id. at 217.
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political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the
light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the possi-
ble consequences ofjudicial action. 142
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution does
not make foreign affairs an exclusive province of only the legislative
and executive branches.
Through the use of procedural tools for joining parties 14 3 and
the remedy of declaratory action, 14 4 courts can aid in developing a
solution to sovereign debt disputes. The concept ofjoinder revolves
around the broad principle that two or more parties cannot be
grouped together and joined in a suit where no mutuality of interest
exists. 14 5 In sovereign debt cases the executive branch has a mutual
interest in the debtor-creditor relationship in two ways. First, there
exists the constitutional concern that any court proceeding might en-
danger U.S. relations with a debtor country. 14 6 Second, there also
exists a legislative basis for joining the executive and shattering the
facade of executive discretion.
The entire bank regulatory framework in the United States is
designed to promote safe and sound banking practices.' 4 7 In the
Banking Act of 1933,148 Congress stated that the two primary pur-
poses of bank regulation were to ensure public confidence in the
banking system by maintaining viable institutions and protecting de-
positors through bank examinations and by deposit insurance. 14 9
Congress established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) to execute these charges. All federally-chartered commercial
142 Id. at 211-12 (objecting to the broad language used to explain abstention in the act
of state case of Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918)).
143 See FED. R. Civ. P. 18-21.
144 See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982) and FED. R. Civ. P. 57.
145 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parties § 92 (1987).
146 See supra notes 119-29 and accompanying text.
147 Banking Act of 1933, PUB. L. No. 66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933)(codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982))(preamble stating "to provide for the safer and more ef-
fective use of the assets of banks, to regulate interbank control, to prevent the undue
diversion of funds into speculative operations, and for other purposes") and 12 C.F.R.
part 337.1 (1987). See also International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3901-3912 (Supp. 1985).
148 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
149 Id. at 166, 168 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 338, 1811 (1982))(providing
for the examination by the Federal Reserve Board of state bank affiliates and amending the
Federal Reserve Act by creating the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to insure bank
deposits).
[Tihe purpose of this legislation is to protect the people of the United States
in the right to have banks in which their deposits will be safe. They have a
right to expect of Congress the establishment and maintenance of a system
of banks in the United States where citizens may place their hard earnings
with reasonable expectation of being able to get them out again upon
demand.
77 CONG. REc. 3837 (1933)(remarks of Rep. Steagall). See generally 5 V. DILORENZO, W.H.
SCHLICHTING & J. COOPER, BANKING LAW § 96.02[2] (1987)(detailing the history and
events leading to the enactment of the Banking Act of 1933, also known as the Glass-
Steagall Act).
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banks and all state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve System are required to acquire deposit insurance and sub-
mit to regulatory examination.' 50 Thus, direct executive supervision
of the nation's 14,000 commercial banks is envisioned.
Despite this required oversight, neither the FDIC nor the two
other federal agencies' 51 have promulgated regulations that govern
U.S. banks engaged in international lending. Though there are a
number of federal laws concerning international banking, most are
procedural rules for the establishment of international opera-
tions.' 52 With the one exception of lending limits, 15 3 it was not until
the passage of the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983
(ILSA) 154 that broad supervision in the form of capital and collateral
IS0 Nationally chartered banks are granted the franchise and supervised by the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency. 12 U.S.C. §§ 26-27 (1982) (the Comptroller exam-
ines the affairs of the association and issues it a certificate authorizing it to do business as a
bank). The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is concerned generally with
overall function and availability of credit in the United States. The Federal Reserve has
primary responsibility for the regulation of bank holding companies. See id. § 1842. The
FDIC examines all insured institutions, irrespective of charter or other agency supervision.
Id. §§ 1814-1816.
151 There is a tripartite system of federal bank regulation. In addition to the FDIC, the
National Bank Act authorizes the Comptroller of the Currency to grant national bank char-
ters and to examine those institutions periodically. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21, 26, 27, and 161
(1982); see also id. § 1814(b). The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve examines all
state-chartered banks that are members of the federal reserve system, as well as all bank
holding companies. Id. §§ 221-228, 248.
152 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 601-604a and 321 (United States establishment of foreign
branches); 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-631 (organization of corporations to do foreign banking); 12
U.S.C. § 1843(c)(13)(international banking facilities); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(14) and 15
U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003 (export trading companies); 12 U.S.C. §§ 347d, 378, 601, 61 la, 614,
615, 618, 619, 1813, 1815, 1817-1818, 1820-1823, 1828, 1829b, 1831b, 1841 (bank hold-
ing companies), 3101-3108 (foreign bank participation in domestic markets); and 12
C.F.R. parts 28, 211 (1987).
153 12 U.S.C. § 84 limits the amount of loans a national bank may make to one bor-
rower to 15% of the bank's capital funds. The early regulations, 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.1310,
7.1320 (1977), did not address the unique situations found in international lending. For
example, the regulations made no mention of if and how banks were to combine loans
made to a sovereign with those made to private companies that were subsequently nation-
alized. Though the regulations were amended in 1979, they require combination only if
the borrowing entity fails to meet either of two tests-the means test or the purpose test.
The means test requires that the borrower have resources of its own, sufficient to service
its debt. The purpose test requires that a loan be obtained for a purpose that is consistent
with a borrower's general business purpose. 12 C.F.R. § 32.5(d)(1)(i), (ii) (1987). Despite
its good intention, the regulations have not served to restrain international lending be-
cause there are usually enough separate entities in most countries to avoid banks having to
combine loans for purposes of the lending limits.
The exposure of nine money center banks to non-OPEC developing countries relative
to capital was 148 percent of gross capital. Review of the International Lending Supervision Act
of 1983, Hearing before the Subcomm. on International Finance and MVonetay Policy of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986)(statement of
William Taylor, Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System) [hereinafter Subcommittee Review].
'54 12 U.S.C. § 3901-3912 (Supp. 1985). For a discussion of the act's history, see
Ongman, Federal Regulation of Lending Abroad: Past History, Cnrrett Practice and Future Pros-
pects, 17 L. & POL'V INT'L Bus. 679 (1985).
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requirements and risk evaluation strategies came to exist. ILSA at-
tempted to promote bank safety and soundness through increased
requirements for bank capital, enhanced disclosure of sovereign
lending to less-developed nations, and special reserves for value-im-
paired international debt. 155 While all lenders must estimate the
ability of a prospective debtor to repay its obligations, those credi-
tors involved in sovereign finance must also assess the political sta-
bility of the borrowing nation. The very decision to lend becomes
both an economic and political choice.
The anticipated high return on sovereign loans encouraged
banks to lend without regard to political risks. Even when debtor
countries were unable to accommodate their repayment schedules,
the executive's supervisory agencies did not outline restrictions that
would ensure against improvident measures by fearful banks. The
executive's failure to exercise careful oversight has resulted in banks
becoming less concerned about repayment and extending additional
loans to permit countries to continue to make interest payments. 156
Regulatory inaction has created a situation in which debt servicing by
debtor countries averages approximately one-third of their gross na-
tional product.' 57 Many of the largest U.S. banks have single-coun-
try debt exposure equal to or greater than their equity capital.' 58
Sovereign responses to their repayment crises are also political acts
that go beyond the scope of the U.S. judiciary's province to provide
effective resolution of the debtor-creditor dispute.
The executive's stated position on international debt does not
emphasize specific efforts designed to ensure safe and sound bank-
ing operations.' 59 The most recent administration statement on the
155 Ongman, supra note 154, at 697-715. By and large, the most visible effect of the
act has been to lead U.S. banks to expand their capitalization. Subconmittee Review, supra
note 153, at 2.
The act does not establish comparable limits on international bank activities such as
lending limits to single borrowers, or rules requiring the aggregation of loans to a bor-
rower. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 84 & 85. Arguably, all of these efforts are too little too late.
Worldwide debt of developing countries exceeds the $1 trillion dollar mark. WORLD
BANK, WORLD DEBT TABLES vii (1987)(projeciing the total debt for all developing nations
at the end of fiscal year 1987 at $1 trillion, 180 billion).
156 While appropriate criticism has been and should be leveled at bankers for lacking
the prudence to take fewer risks in their sovereign lending, one should not lose sight of
the fact that banking law required administrative supervision of these banks. Even if the
tension between the private and public aspects of banking led to the lack of supervision in
this area, the executive branch would have no excuse for its actions.
157 Goldstein, The Contipning Ilorld Debt Crisis, 3 IN'L TAX & Bus. LAW 119, 130-132
(1985).
I 5 See shpra note 150.
151) A preferred policy would require: I) internal economic adjustments by debtor na-
tions to stabilize their economies; 2) Inlternational Monetary Fund intervention to assist in
the redesign of economic programs and to provide short-term financing; 3) support from
the governments of large creditor countries to assist debtors during the adjustment peri-
ods; 4) enconragement of further commercial lending to nations that implement IMF pro-
grains; and 5) encouragement of open markets and private-sector expansion. See Hearings
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problem of international debt came from Treasury Secretary James
Baker. Speaking at the IMF-World Bank meeting in Seoul, South
Korea, in August 1985, Secretary Baker recommended: (1) commer-
cial banks increase their debt exposure to the largest debtor coun-
tries; (2) development banks like the World Bank increase loan
disbursements to debtor nations as well as guarantee direct invest-
ments; and (3) debtor countries make adjustments in their internal
economies such as transferring inefficient state enterprises to the pri-
vate sector, liberalizing trade practices, and loosening controls on
foreign investment.160
While the Baker Plan emphasizes the interdependence of the
world economy, it is woefully lacking in specifics. The plan does not
address the likely effect of the IMF austerity measures on the political
stability of debtor countries. Moreover, it does not address the rela-
tionship of the IMF and World Bank to the long-term development
of debtor countries. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the plan
says nothing about domestic measures that will be taken to ensure
the continued viability of U.S. banks. Asking banks to continue to
lend to over-extended debtor nations with declining economies is ir-
responsible and specifically violates the congressional requirement
that the executive act affirmatively to ensure a sound banking system.
To meet its legal charge of protecting public confidence, the ex-
ecutive branch either must intervene' 6' or be joined in problem in-
ternational lending cases. Because adequate remedies cannot be
fashioned without its participation, the executive is already a neces-
sary party in any litigation involving sovereign loans. 162 Given a basis
to bring the executive into litigation, courts should then require de-
tailed explanations of how problem international loans affect U.S.
foreign policy. Because Congress envisioned and provided for exec-
utive action, courts have the power to assess administration re-
sponses to sovereign loan problems and, where necessary, order
intervention.
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the
compulsory joinder of nonparties to avoid multiple suits and incon-
sistent verdicts. 163 The rule provides that nonparties should be
joined: (1) when complete relief without joinder cannot be accorded
among those already parties in the suit; 164 (2) when a nonparty's
ability to protect an interest that is related to the case at bar, may be
Before the Senate Subconim. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 55-61 (1983)(statement of Donald T. Re-
gan, Secretary of the Treasury).
; See Bogdanowicz-Bindert, I Vorld Debt: The United States Reconsiders, 64 FOREIGN AFF.
259, 267-68 (1985-1986).
I(" See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2)(intervention of right).
162 See supra notes 11, 130-44 and accompanying text.
1' For the text of the rule, see supra note 12.
164 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(I).
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impaired unless the nonparty comes into the litigation;' 65 and
(3) when a party in the litigation could be subjected to a multiple
liability or inconsistent obligations unless a nonparty joins in the
suit. 16 6 Commentators most often explain compulsory joinder in
terms of harm to the judiciary through multiple suits. 1 6 7 In sover-
eign debt cases, it seems quite plausible that compulsory joinder
could be explained in terms of potential harm to the political
branches of government. Without government representatives sit-
ting down to discuss a sovereign borrower's nonpayment of private
debt, the prospects for harsh words between debtor and creditor as
well as political embarrassment to U.S.-debtor nation relations are
real. Moreover, the absence of the U.S. Government from any litiga-
tion involving sovereign debt could pose serious risks to monies di-
rectly owed the government by the same sovereign debtor.
Therefore, a case for compulsory joinder can be made. 168 Finally,
the common-sense logic of bringing the executive into debt discus-
sions cannot be disputed.
The Allied H court recognized that cooperative adjustment of in-
ternational debt problems can be accomplished through the renego-
tiation and modification of the lending contract.' 69 What the court
failed to understand was that effective restructuring can be realized
only if the U.S. Government is made a party to the discussions.170
By permitting the executive to elect to remain out of restructuring
talks, the possibility of effective problem resolution is reduced sub-
stantially. Further, executive discretion and forbearance endangers
the safety and soundness of the domestic banking system. Contribu-
tions by the United States to organizations like the World Bank and
the IMF are not substitutes for sovereign-to-sovereign discussions.
The unique facts of sovereign risk lending make repayment
problems a public issue and therefore demands direct participation
of the government.
By bringing the executive into the forum, a court can discover,
evaluate, and balance the national interests in foreign relations and
in maintaining a safe and sound banking system with the needs of the
165 Id. 19(a)(2)(i).
166 Id. 19(a)(2)(ii).
167 See, e.g., Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal Rule 19,
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061, 1063 (1985); McCoid, A Single Package for Mlultiparty Disputes, 28
STAN. L. REV. 707, 708 (1976).
168 For an interesting argument in favor of compulsory joinder for necessary parties in
collective bargaining, see Rutherglen, Procedures and Preferences: Remedies for Employment Dis-
crimination, 5 REV. OF LITIGATION 73, 103-15 (1986).
169 757 F.2d at 519.
170 For a good case study of the problems of debt restructuring, see Tapia, .Iexicos
Debt Restructuring: The Evolving Solution, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1985). The IMF
played an integral role in the Mexican restructuring. For a description of the IMF's meth-
ods, see Edwards, Is an IMF Stand-By Arrangement a "Seal of Approval on 11'hich Other Creditors
Can Rely?, 17 N.Y.U.J. OF INT'L L. & POL. 573 (1985).
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individual plaintiffs. By crafting a remedy that requires the executive
to designate representatives to participate in lending renegotiation
sessions, courts not only recognize but also more easily accommo-
date both sets of competing interests. This limited review/remedy
would not embarrass either of the other branches of government be-
cause the court would not have issued a ruling that would be con-
trary to stated policy. Executive intervention would permit the
dissemination of more useful information on how certain decisions
might affect not only the debtor-creditor relation but also U.S.-for-
eign sovereign relations. If a debtor nation had a better understand-
ing of the possible responses a sister state might take should the
debtor repudiate or default on its contractual obligations, the sover-
eign borrower might reconsider taking such action. The executive's
broad abilities to give discretionary foreign assistance, to recom-
mend and implement trade policies, to impose sanctions, and to in-
fluence other nations, all serve to make the executive a super-
mediator in debt talks. Like the political question doctrine, the act of
state principle of extraordinary abstention in certain foreign affairs
cases is unwarranted.
IV. Conclusion
If a dynamic approach to act of state analysis were adopted, the
doctrine's goal of having the judiciary avoid inquiry into foreign af-
fairs would not be met in a number of ways. Though courts would
hear evidence of U.S. foreign policy as it relates to an international
lending dispute, decisions would be directed toward the executive
branch and not the foreign sovereign. By requiring executive inter-
vention without adjudication, courts would not create foreign affairs
problems by offending a foreign sovereign.
In Allied Bank, no Costa Rican assets located in the United States
were attached nor did the court freeze any funds. Allied thus won a
hollow victory. The executive's abilities to reach agreement with an-
other nation on its private obligations enhances the possibility of real
movement toward solving debt repayment problems. Executive
branch presence in the conference room contributes to an atmos-
phere of cooperation in restructuring talks. The potential for divi-
sive measures among different creditors would be reduced and
coordination among creditors is strengthened.
Despite these positive prospects, executive branch participation
still does not assure success. International debt problems will not
disappear without hard work and sacrifice in both debtor and credi-
tor countries. The probabilities of effective redress and continued
international comity are heightened through executive participation,
however. Unfortunately, the act of state doctrine has been used by
the executive to avoid meeting the duties expected of it under fed-
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eral banking statutes. By focusing their analysis on the domestic sov-
ereign, courts can remain true to the doctrine yet offer aggrieved
lenders a greater opportunity to resolve problem loans.
